Using Japanese …rm data covering the Japanese …nancial crisis in the early 1990s, we …nd that exporters' domestic sales declined more signi…cantly than their foreign sales, which in turn declined more signi…cantly than non-exporters' sales. This stylized fact provides a new litmus test for di¤erent theories proposed in the literature to explain the "great trade collapse" associated with the recent global …nancial crisis. In this paper we embed the Melitz's (2003) model into a tractable DSGE framework with incomplete …nancial markets and endogenous credit allocation to explain both the Japanese data and the "great trade collapse." The model highlights the role of credit reallocation between non-exporters and exporters as the main mechanism in explaining exporters' behaviors and trade collapse following a …nancial crisis.
Introduction
It is now well known that one of the most striking aspects of the recent 2008 global …nancial crisis is the subsequent collapse in world trade, especially among developed countries with deeper …nancial markets. This decline in trade is so severe that it de…es explanations based on standard trade models and is later referred to as the "great trade collapse" puzzle by the existing literature. 1 Figure 1 shows that the average cross-country decline in total trade volume (exports and imports, respectively) between 2008 and 2009 is 17% for the G7 countries (right panel), nearly 4 times larger than the average decline in these countries' gross domestic product (GDP, left panel). However, a severe trade collapse during a …nancial crisis is not a new phenomenon. Many countries that had …nancial crises also experienced a sharp contraction in trade volume relative to output. To quote Amiti and Weinstein (2011, p.1), "[A] striking feature of many …nancial crises is the collapse of exports relative to output." 1 Ronci (2004) documents that in many countries that had …nancial crisis, trade volume contracted far more sharply and signi…cantly than GDP. Also, using a measure of an international-trade wedge, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) show that the overall trade wedge during the recent …nancial crisis reached 40%, whereas the mean value of the wedge was only 1:6% in the Great Moderation period since 1983. They thus conclude that the recent trade collapse does represent a puzzle from the perspective of standard neoclassical business cycle models.
Why did trade volume decrease fare more severely than aggregate output during a …nancial crisis? Several strands of literature have been developed to explain the links between …nancial conditions and international trade.
First, such links have been studied empirically by many people. For example, Chor and Manova (2011) show that credit conditions have an important e¤ect on trade. Their empirical …ndings based on monthly U.S. imports data suggest that countries experiencing higher interbank rates-and thus worse credit market conditions-tend to export less to the U.S. during the peak of the crisis. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) use a unique dataset, covering the Japanese …nancial crisis in the early 1990s, to demonstrate that the health of banks that provide external …nance has a much larger e¤ect on exports than on domestic sales. Raddatz (2008) shows there is greater comovement among sectors that have stronger trade-credit links. Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) demonstrate that in countries experiencing banking crises, exports fell systematically more in …nancially dependent industries. Using four di¤erent measures of credit constraints and a large dataset of Chinese …rms, Egger and Kesina (2010) …nd a signi…cant impact of …rms' …nancial constraints on both the extensive margin and the intensive margin of …rms' export activities; they estimate the impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in …nancial constraints on the extensive margin is at least half as strong as the same decrease in …rms' productivity. Similarly, Minetti and Zhu (2011) also …nd a strong impact of credit rationing on both the extensive margin and the intensive margin of trade. They estimate that credit-rationed …rms are 39% less likely to export and that credit rationing reduces …rms' foreign sales by 38%. 2 Second, theoretical models have been proposed to explain the great trade collapse. This segment of the literature believes that it is the weakening of aggregate demand (either foreign demand or domestic demand) during a …nancial crisis, or a sharp decline in total factor productivity (TFP) during the crisis, rather than the …nancial conditions per se, that caused the trade collapse. Hence, the theoretical literature mainly relies on non-…nancial shocks to explain the signi…cantly larger decline in trade volume than GDP after 2008. For example, Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) argue that aggregate productivity shocks can explain the great trade collapse when dynamic inventory adjustment is taken into account. Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010) argue that vertical linkages amplify demand disturbances on trade volume in an input-output framework-their verbal defense for the importance of demand shocks in the great trade collapse is that …nancial intermediation is severely a¤ected during the crisis, reducing the economy's e¢ciency in transforming inputs into outputs and leading to reductions in overall productivity and demand; but the mechanism is not modeled in their work. These important works have no doubt contributed to our understanding of the links between the business cycle and international trade, as well as the plausible causes of the great trade collapse. But a deeper theoretical question regarding the role of non-…nancial shocks is why aggregate demand (or aggregate TFP) changed simultaneously in di¤erent countries during the recent global …nancial crisis. What was coordinating these country-speci…c demand (supply) shocks? Another challenge to non-…nancial shock theories is explaining why this recent recession is more severe than the other recessions in the Great Moderation period-and particularly why the recent collapse in trade volume is far larger than that in GDP compared with historical recessions. 3 To address these questions and to bring these two literatures together, we need a dynamic trade model that takes …nancial intermediation seriously. As Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010, p.32) amply put: "[A] clearly preferred framework would be one that...digs deeper into the sources of shocks that drive the joint behavior of demand, output and trade," and "an even deeper methodology is one that marries a …nancial sector, as well as trade structure...to the framework." 4 To answer this challenge put fourth by Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010), this paper makes two contributions. First, we empirically document a new stylized fact that calls for a deeper understanding on the joint behavior of demand, output, and trade and their relationship with credit and …nancial intermediation. More speci…cally, we focus on the Japanese …nancial 3 It seems that changes in aggregate demand and productivity in 2009 are the endogenous outcome of the 2008 …nancial crisis rather than the exogenous root cause of the crisis. In particular, why would a domestic TFP shock or demand shock trigger a disproportionately larger decline in total exports than GDP, given that exports demand is dictated by foreign countries' economic conditions? In other words, even if …nancial crises are contagious, it would be questionable to rely solely on non-…nancial shocks to explain the great trade collapse because changes in aggregate productivity and demand during the crisis period are endogenous-they are themselves the consequences of the …nancial crisis, not the root cause of the crisis. 4 In particular, why would a domestic …nancial crisis trigger a disproportionately larger decline in total exports than GDP, given that exports demand is originated from other countries? Even if …nancial crises are contagious, it would be di¢cult to rely solely on non-…nancial shocks (such as aggregate productivity or aggregate demand shocks) to explain the great trade collapse because changes in aggregate productivity and demand during the crisis period are endogenous-they are themselves the consequences of the …nancial crisis, not the root of the crisis. crisis in the early 1990s and its subsequent trade collapse-looking at the Japanese episode provides a clear advantage: Unlike the recent global recession, the Japanese trade collapse was not accompanied by external demand shocks to the Japanese economy. Using Japanese …rm-level data covering the Japanese …nancial crisis period in the early 1990s, we …nd that the Japanese recession and trade collapse during the Japanese …nancial crisis are characterized by the following pattern of …rm sales: Exporting …rms' domestic sales declined more signi…cantly than their foreign sales, which in turn declined more signi…cantly than non-exporters' sales.
This stylized fact is intriguing because it suggests that the Japanese trade collapse in the early 90s cannot be attributed to foreign demand shocks, which would imply a sharper drop in exporters' foreign sales than their domestic sales, nor solely to domestic demand shocks, which would result in a sharper drop in non-exporters' sales than exporters' foreign sales.
Also, it cannot be explained by a negative shock to Japan's aggregate TFP because (similar to an aggregate domestic demand shock) such a shock would result in a sharper decline in non-exporters' sales than in exporters' foreign sales. 5 In addition, these stylized facts cast doubts on the conventional wisdom that …rms' export activities are more …nancially dependent than selling at home-which would lead to a sharper drop in exporters' foreign sales than their domestic sales during a …nancial crisis, thus contradicting the stylized facts based on Japanese …rm-level data.
Our second contribution is to build a tractable DSGE model of international trade with …nancial intermediation and credit-based trade structure to explain the Japanese …rm-level experience in the early 1990s, while the model's predictions are also consistent with the great trade collapse after the 2008 global …nancial crisis. In our model, …rms can choose to sell locally in domestic markets or abroad in foreign markets; however, endogenous credit arrangements among heterogeneous …rms exist so that …nancial assets can be traded among …rms, and …rms must use capital as collateral to engage in borrowing under limited contract enforceability. Because of the additional operational costs involved in exports (a la Melitz, 2003) , only high-productivity …rms opt to export, and such …rms will have a higher demand for working capital and outside credit to …nance their activities than non-exporters.
In addition, exporters also …nd it pro…table to sell domestically due to the Melitz-type monopolistic competition structure and the lower market-participation costs at home. Since …nancial markets facilitate the ‡ow of capital to where it is needed, the asymmetry in credit demand between exporters and non-exporters implies that …nancial shocks impeding the ‡ow of credit have a greater impact on exporters than on non-exporters. Given that a domestic …nancial crisis endogenously a¤ects domestic aggregate demand more signi…cantly than foreign demand, exporters' domestic sales are expected to decline more sharply than their foreign sales. In the meantime, TFP declines endogenously and trade volume drops more signi…cantly than GDP during the …nancial crisis. 6 We also show that non-…nancial shocks, such as aggregate TFP shocks and aggregate demand shocks, cannot provide a fully satisfactory explanation for the stylized facts. For example, under a domestic TFP shock or a domestic demand shock, domestic …rms' total sales would drop more than exporters' foreign sales. 7 On the other hand, under a foreign demand shock, exporters' foreign sales would drop more than their domestic sales. Neither implication is consistent with the Japanese …rm-level data. Hence, our theoretical analysis suggests that the sharp decline in TFP or aggregate demand observed during a …nancial crisis is the endogenous outcome of the …nancial crisis, rather than the direct driving force of the trade collapse during the crisis.
Another immediate implication of our model is that deeper …nancial markets enhance aggregate productivity and international trade in the long run. Consequently, both GDP level and the trade volume-to-GDP ratio rise with …nancial development in our model. This explains why during the recent global …nancial crisis trade volume declined more for advanced countries than less developed countries-because advanced countries have deeper …nancial markets. This long-run relationship is also consistent with the empirical facts documented by the existing literature (e.g., see Manova, 2011) . 8 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the new stylized fact using …rm-level data covering the Japanese …nancial crisis in the early 90s. Section 3 6 In other words, since exporters are more productive than non-exporters, in normal times when the …nancial market is functioning properly, capital (or credit) will be channeled from low-productivity …rms (in the domestic-goods sector) to high-productivity …rms (in the export sector). This upward capital ‡ow improves the e¢ciency of resource allocation and raises the level of aggregate productivity and output. However, the heavy reliance on external …nance also makes exporters more vulnerable to …nancial shocks. Thus, during a …nancial crisis (say, due to the tightening of the borrowing limit), the upward ‡ow of …nancial capital is hindered. Consequently, capital withdraws from the export sector and retreats to the domestic sector, causing a disproportionately larger drop in trade volume (e.g., exports) relative to aggregate income. In addition, since a domestic …nancial shock adversely a¤ects domestic aggregate demand more than foreign aggregate demand, exporters' domestic sales decline more sharply than their foreign sales. 7 As Almunia, Antras, Lopez-Rodriguez and Morales (2018) have argued, in the face of a domestic demand slump, exporters shift their sales from domestic markets to foreign markets. In our model, this is also the case in the sense that a negative aggregate demand shock induces exporters to shift their sales from domestic markets to foreign markets, resulting in a sharper decline in domestic sales than foreign sales. Nonetheless, non-exporters' sales would drop more than exporters' foreign sales because a domestic …nancial crisis has little impact on foreign countries' domestic demand. 8 Leibovici (2018) builds a quantitative multi-industry model to study the cross-sector reallocation of trade shares under …nancial development. Our focus is within industry capital allocation between exporters and non-exporters. Moreover, our primary motivation is to explain the short-run ‡uctuations due to …nancial shocks rather than long-run equilibrium. 6 describes the set up of our theoretical model and solves …rms' decision rules in closed form. Section 4 studies the aggregate implications of the model under …nancial and non-…nancial shocks, as well as long-run implications of …nancial development on international trade. Section 5 concludes the paper with remarks for future studies.
Japan's Financial Crisis
There are several reasons we focus on the Japanese …nancial crisis in the early 90s. First, Japan is a major exporter in the world, which has global implications, and its …rms are well known to be bank-dependent. During that time, Japan's banking sector experienced signi…cant contractions, which generated a credit crunch on …rms. Second, this domestic credit supply shock is not accompanied by a global …nancial crisis, thus ruling out the possibility that a weak external demand played an important role in driving down Japan's export slump. Finally, the …rm-level data enable us to separate Japanese …rms' foreign sales from their domestic sales since most exporters also sell domestically.
After a long period of an asset bubble, Japanese asset prices peaked around [1989] [1990] and started to fall afterward. Japanese banks' stock prices fell sharply in late 1991 and early 1992. Subsequently, Japanese exports collapsed in 1993 (see the left panel of Figure   2 ). During the trade collapse, Japan's total exports-to-GDP ratio dropped (blue line in the middle panel of Figure 2 ), as compared with the exports-to-GDP ratio in other G7 countries (green line in the same panel). Also, Japan's exports dropped more signi…cantly than total domestic sales (right panel of Figure 2 ). These experiences are similar to what happened during the great trade collapse.
Japanese …rm-level data reveal the same picture. We use data from the DBJ (Development Bank of Japan) database of unconsolidated corporate reports, which include Japan's listed …rms' balance sheet information. Figure 3 (dashed green line) shows the growth rate of Japan's listed …rms' total exports during the crisis period based on aggregated DBJ …rmlevel data (dashed green line). The exports growth of all …rms is also plotted in Figure 3 (red solid line) to ensure that the information based on listed …rms is representative. If the aggregate export decline is mainly driven by the argument that exporting is more …nance dependent than selling at home is, we should have observed the opposite. While we by no means argue that exporting is the same as selling at home in terms of …nancial dependence, the evidence shows that the importance of that argument in explaining aggregate dynamics might be limited.
To reveal that such heterogeneous behaviors between exporters and non-exporters have to do with …rms' debt-credit positions, Figure 5 shows the debt level of the exporters and nonexporters (with 1990 normalized to 100). Clearly, the exporters' debt position experienced a dramatic decline after the crisis, as compared to non-exporters' debt position. 9 To summarize, the Japanese …nancial crisis in 1990 triggered the same type of trade collapse as observed around the 2008 global …nancial crisis. However, the Japanese …rmlevel data also revealed that (i) not only did the exporters su¤er more signi…cantly than the non-exporters in terms of sales, but (ii) the exporters' domestic sales declined more than their foreign sales, and (iii) exporters' debt positions also deteriorated more signi…cantly In what follows, we construct a small-open economy DSGE model of credit allocation (across exporting and non-exporting …rms) to explain these stylized facts. We show that the excessive sensitivity of exporters to credit conditions holds the key for the great trade collapse after the 2008 …nancial crisis and the Japanese stylized fact-during booms, credit tends to ‡ow from the non-exporting sector to the exporting sector; but such a healthy credit ‡ow is severely interrupted and reversed during a recession caused by a …nancial crisis.
3 The Model
General Environment
The model consists of a home country and the rest of the world (ROW). In the home country there is a representative …nal-goods producer, a continuum of intermediate-goods producers, and a representative household.
The representative …nal-goods producer uses intermediate goods to produce the …nal output. The production technology is given by
where M f t denotes a homogeneous imported foreign good and M ht denotes an aggregation of domestically produced intermediate goods. The elasticity of substitution between the two types of goods is given by 0. The parameter ' captures the home bias in the …nal goods production.
There is a continuum of monopolistic intermediate-goods producing …rms in the home country, each supplying a di¤erentiated variety i 2 [0; 1]. These products are aggregated according to the technology:
where y d it is the quantity of …rm i's domestic supply and > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between these varieties. The price index of M ht is given by
(
The demand function for an individual …rm i's good is
The demand function for a foreign intermediate good is
where E t is the foreign aggregate demand taken as exogenously given by the home country.
Intermediate-goods …rms produce output y it by combining capital and labor according to the Cobb-Douglas production function,
where A t denotes aggregate productivity shock at home, which is common for all intermediategoods …rms; and z it denotes a …rm-speci…c productivity shock, which is assumed to be i. …rms to borrow and low-productivity …rms to lend in a bond market.
The same logic applies to international trade with additional operational costs involved in exports. For example, a …rm with high productivity may opt to issue debt and enter the foreign market by paying the …xed export costs, while a …rm with low productivity may opt to sell locally and hold other …rms' debt as an insurance device in the anticipation that future productivity may be high. However, because of limited contract enforcement, …rms are borrowing constrained by their net worth. The details of the …nancial market structure is provided in Section 3.4.
Household's Problem
A representative household in the home country has a …xed endowment of time. The household chooses consumption C t , hours worked H t , and equity holdings for each …rm i's share
subject to the budget constraint,
where P t is the …nal goods's price, W t is the wage rate, d it is the dividend payment from …rm i, and v it is …rm i's value before dividends. t is a preference shock to capture exogenous changes in aggregate demand with a steady state value of 1.
Denoting t as the Lagrangian multiplier of the household budget constraint, the …rstorder conditions for fC t ; H t ; q it+1 g are given, respectively, by
The last equation implies that …rm i's value is given by the present value of future dividends:
…nal-goods Firm's Problem
Denote the price of foreign-produced intermediate goods sold in the home country by P f , which is taken as given by the home country. The objective function of the representative …nal-goods …rm is to solve
subject to equation (1). The demand functions for intermediate inputs are given by
The production function is constant return to scale, so the pro…t of the …nal-goods …rm is zero,
Financial Market and Intermediate-goods Firm's Decision Rules
There is a bond market where intermediate-goods …rms can engage in lending and borrowing capital by trading bonds. In a sense, the bond market serves as a competitive rental market for installed capital. 11 A …rm can borrow the amount b t in the bond market to augment its current capital stock at the beginning of period t, and pay back the loan at the end of period t with gross interest rate 1 + r t . At the end of each period t, after paying dividends to households and debt to the lenders, a …rm's net worth (net savings) in terms of …nal goodss is denoted by s t , which can be used to …nance the next-period's capital stock,
where b t+1 denotes new loans issued (funds borrowed) in the next period. Notice that we allow b t+1 < 0, implying that a …rm can choose to be a lender.
The …rm enters the next period (t + 1) with a random draw of productivity shock z t+1 in the beginning of t + 1 before making production decisions. To help …nance its capital stock in period t + 1, the …rm can borrow the amount b t+1 with the credit constraint,
where t+1 2 (0; 1) is an indicator of …nancial conditions in period t + 1. Equations (17) and
where 1 is the leverage ratio.
Upon the realization of z t+1 , a …rm decides whether to (i) be an exporter serving both the domestic market and the foreign market (by paying a …xed cost to access the foreign market), or (ii) be a non-exporter serving only the domestic market. After production and sales, the …rm pays o¤ its debt (1 + r t+1 ) b t+1 (when b < 0, they receive interest payments from the …nancial market), gives dividends d t+1 to equity holders, and carries net worth s t+1 to the next period t + 2; so on and so forth.
Denote x t =P t as a …rm's maximum ex post real cash ‡ow (measured in …nal goodss) after choosing production, making sales in its chosen markets, and paying wage bills and its debt
(1 + r t ) b t , but before giving dividends. More speci…cally, depending on the …rm's chosen market status (exporter or non-exporter), we have
where the …rst row denotes an exporting …rm's real cash ‡ow, and the second row denotes a domestic …rm's real cash ‡ow. Note that for exporters, we have
and for domestic …rms, we have
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Denoting E t M ht P ht and the parameter (1 )(1 1 ) for a domestic …rm, its cash ‡ow is given by
and its optimal labor demand is
For an exporter, its cash ‡ow is given by
= "
With these notations, an intermediate-good …rm's dynamic saving problem (dividends policy) is to solve
where the cash ‡ow x t is given by equations (23) and (26) .
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium in which the decision of s t is independent of the history of each …rm's cash ‡ow and idiosyncratic shocks, fx t j ; z t j g t j=0 .
Proof. Notice that (i) only x t+1 depends on s t (through k t+1 ), and (ii) only z t+1 can a¤ect
x t+1 . The …rst-order condition for s t in the above problem is
where P t is the marginal cost of saving one additional unit of cash ‡ow (in terms of …nal goods) and the right-hand side is the expected future marginal returns to saving. Given that the future marginal product of capital is i.i.d, the expected future return to saving depends only on the distribution of z and hence is the same for all …rms. So this optimal …rst-order condition ensures that the history of idiosyncratic shocks and cash ‡ows, fz t j ; x t j g t j=0 , is irrelevant for the choice of s t (because maximizing x t+1 is an intra-period problem and does not involve any dynamic considerations). 12 Hence, in equilibrium all intermediate-goods …rms will bring the same amount of savings (net worth) s t to the next period. This means that a …rm making more pro…t pays more dividends and that a …rm making less pro…t pays proportionately less dividends, and all …rms end up with the same net worth s t when entering the next period t + 1. Next, we turn to the intraperiod optimal decisions of a …rm in period t + 1. It is easy to verify that the intraperiod objective of a …rm is to maximize its cash ‡ow x t+1 by choosing the capital stock k t+1 , labor demand l t+1 , the level of debt b t+1 , and the market status (i.e., whether to be an exporter or not) after observing the productivity shock z t+1 . That is, given the …rm's last-period net worth s t , the real interest rate r t+1 , the real wage W t+1 P t+1 , and the aggregate demand (E t ; E t ), the intermediate-goods …rm solves the following problem after the productivity shock z t+1 is realized:
subject to constraints (17), (18) , and (20) . Denoting (32) then the borrowing constraint can be re-written as k t t s t 1 :
The optimal decision rules are characterized by two cuto¤s for productivity shocks: a lower cuto¤ Z t determining whether a …rm borrows to bind its collateral constraint in the credit market, and a higher cuto¤ Z t determining whether a …rm is an exporter or a nonexporter. The most productive …rms with z t Z t will choose to be exporters and will borrow to their borrowing limits; the least productive …rms with z t Z t will choose to be non-exporters (there are both lenders and borrowers); and the rest will choose to serve domestic markets while being borrowers.
More speci…cally, for any domestic …rm with z t Z t , its optimal capital stock is determined by the …rst-order condition with respect to k t ,
and its borrowing constraint does not bind. For a domestic …rm with z t 2 (Z t ; Z t ), its borrowing constraint will be binding. The lower cuto¤ of productivity, Z t , is determined by the following equation
where the left-hand side is the marginal value of capital of a …rm with z t = Z t and the right-hand side is the marginal (user's) cost of capital facing the …rm.
For an exporting …rm, its borrowing constraint will be binding. The higher cuto¤ Z t is determined by the equation
where k t = t s t 1 , and the left-hand side is the gains when being an exporter while the right-hand side the gains when being a non-exporter. The gap between the gains is the …xed cost to export. That is, the higher cuto¤ is determined at the point where the …rm opts to borrow to its borrowing limit and is indi¤erent between exporting and non-exporting.
Consequently, a domestic …rm's output is
while an exporter's output is split into two parts with respect to two distinct markets (home and foreign):
(38)
The domestic …rms' pricing is
while exporters' pricing is
The domestic price index for home-produced intermediate goods is
Denoting
, we have the following proposition:
The optimal cash ‡ow x t+1 and decision rules for fl t+1 ; k t+1 ; b t+1 g are given, respectively, by
where the …rst cuto¤ Z t+1 determines whether a …rm borrows to bind its borrowing constraint, and the second cuto¤ Z t+1 (the export cuto¤) determines whether a …rm exports or not.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition shows the capital-reallocating role of the …nancial (bond) market.
It allows the most-productive …rms to borrow from the other …rms to expand its scale of production, and the least-productive …rms to save through the …nancial market (receiving positive returns above the marginal product of capital on their savings), and to reduce their scale of production.
Henceforth, we assume that productivity shocks z follow the Pareto distribution as in Melitz (2003) :
with support z 2 [1; 1) and the shape parameter 1. The p.d.f. is then
By Proposition 2, we obtain a …rm's expected cash ‡ow (before the idiosyncratic productivity shock z t+1 is realized) as
where
The above expression for expected cash ‡ow allows us to solve equation (30) analytically 20 (note that the two cuto¤s are related to s t as well):
Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is de…ned as the sequences of fs it ; x it ; b it ; l it ; k it g 1 t=0 , fC t ; H t ; q it g 1 t=0 , and fw t ; r t ; v t ; P t ; p ht g 1 t=0 for all i 2 [0; 1] such that 1. Intermediate-goods …rms solve problems (28) and (31) 2. …nal-goodss …rms solve problem (13) 3. The household solves problem (7) 4. All markets clear. The market clearing conditions include 
(4.f.) the …nal-goods market-clearing condition:
Notice that when a domestic …rm does not reach its borrowing limit, we have
so the labor market-clearing condition implies
(60) and the bond market-clearing condition implies
and the balance of trade condition is given by
4 Aggregate Dynamics
Aggregation
Proposition 3 Taking f t ; A t ; E t ; t g 1 t=0 and the initial aggregate capital stock K 0 = S 1 as given, the general equilibrium of the model is characterized by the sequences of 15 variables:
t=0 , which can be uniquely solved by the following system of 15 equations:
(62)
(65)
In the proposition, equation (62) 
Calibration
We calibrate our model to the Japanese economy during the sample period before 1990 at the quarterly frequency. We divide the parameters into two categories. One category is taken directly from external sources, and the other category is calibrated to match some key moments of the data.
The …rst category includes parameters f ; ; ; ; ; ; ss g, whose values are directly taken from the literature. Speci…cally, we set the capital depreciation rate = 0:025; the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent domestic varieties = 4, which falls into the range of estimates from the existing literature; the capital share = 0:42; which is the average of estimates from Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and the Penn World Table; the Pareto shape parameter = 1:6, which is consistent with Dekle, Jeong and Kiyotaki's The second category contains parameters f ; '; f e ; p f ; g, which can be set to match some key moments of the Japanese data. We set = 0:995 to target a steady-state quarterly interest rate of 1.5%. The home-bias parameter in …nal-goods production is set to 0.75 to match Japan's 14% export/GDP ratio in 1985. The remaining three parameters ff e ; p f ; g are set to match the fraction of hours worked H = 0:15, (household) consumption-to-GDP ratio 54%, and the fraction of exporters in all …rms 0:5%; thus, f e = 2:1732, p f = 0:2336, and = 61:5274. 13 
Steady-State Analysis
We start with a steady-state analysis. Figure 6 …nancial development in our model (represented by the loan-to-value ratio ) raises trade-to-GDP ratio, the amount of capital allocated to the export sector, and TFP, and it increases 13 Tomiura (2007) uses a manufacturing survey for Japanese …rms (only …rms with fewer than 50 employees) and …nds that around 6.3% of …rms (out of 7,479 …rms in the sample) are exporters. However, the manufacturing industry only accounts for less than 1/4 of Japan's GDP. The number of establishments in Japan is several million (for instance, this number is 5,911,038 in 2006, which gives us a lower bound estimate of 0.13% for the fraction of exporters in all …rms). We choose 0.5% as a benchmark, but our results are robust when we set this number to other values around 0.5%. consumption by lowering the stock of aggregate capital (thanks to the improved e¢ciency of capital). The underlying mechanism is that …nancial development allows capital in the economy to be allocated to the most-productive users (such as …rms in the export sector which have higher productivity). 
Impulse Responses under Aggregate Shocks
Assume that the productivity shock A t , the …nancial shock t , the home aggregate demand shock t , and the foreign demand shock E t all follow an AR(1) process with the same persistent parameter = 0:9:
The model's impulse responses to a shock (1% exogenous change) in A t , t , t , and E t are presented, respectively, in columns 1-4 in Figure 7 , where the …rst row is total exports, the second row is GDP, the third row is exports-to-GDP ratio, and the fourth row is the cuto¤ Z t . The …gure shows that TFP shock (column 1) cannot explain the phenomenon of a trade collapse: Under a negative TFP shock, exports drop less signi…cantly than GDP, thus the exports-to-GDP ratio rises instead of falls on impact. The key reason is that the cuto¤ (in the last row) does not increase signi…cantly-suggesting that the number of exporters does not decrease su¢ciently to trigger a sharp fall in total exports.
The home demand shock (column 3) is not able to generate a trade collapse either. After a shock to t , both GDP and exports decline, but exports drop less signi…cantly than GDP, thus causing the export-to-GDP ratio to rise instead of fall during the crisis period. The key reason is again that the cuto¤ (in the last row) does not increase signi…cantly-suggesting that the number of exporters does not decrease su¢ciently to trigger a sharp fall in total exports.
However, under either a negative …nancial shock (column 2), or a negative foreign demand shock (column 4), the model can generate a trade collapse in the sense that exports drop more signi…cantly than GDP, and the number of exporting …rms declines, consistent with the great trade collapse after the 2008 …nancial crisis.
For example, under a negative one-standard-deviation shock to the loan-to-value ratio t , the second column in Figure 7 shows that the drop in exports is far more severe than the drop in GDP: After a 1% decrease in the loan-to-value ratio, GDP drops by 0.2% and exports drop by 0.5%, which is more than twice as large as GDP; consequently, the exports-to-GDP ratio drops more than 0.2%. The last row shows that a key mechanism behind the trade collapse is the dramatic reduction in the number of exporting …rms (since the cuto¤ Z t rises sharply after the shock). These predictions are consistent with the 2008 …nancial crisis.
A similar prediction is made under a foreign demand shock, as shown in column 4 in Figure 7 , where total exports drop more than twice as that of GDP, thus causing the exportsto-GDP ratio to drop signi…cantly. Also, the cuto¤ increases signi…cantly after the shock, implying that the number of exporting …rms declines signi…cantly, explaining the more severe drop in total exports than GDP.
Moreover, the Japanese …rm-level data provide an additional litmus test to di¤erentiate these di¤erent theories. The Japanese data show that although the exporters su¤er more severely than the non-exporters, the exporting …rms' domestic sales su¤er more than their foreign sales. This stylized fact immediately rules out the foreign demand shock theory as it implies a more severe drop in exporters' foreign sales than their domestic sales.
This …rm-level stylized fact also rejects the domestic demand shock theory: Under a However, under a TFP shock, non-exporters' sales drop more than exporters' foreign sales, inconsistent with the Japanese experience. Under a foreign-demand shock, exporters' foreign sales drop far more signi…cantly than their domestic sales and non-exporters' sales, also inconsistent with the Japanese experience. Finally, under a domestic-demand shock, non-exporters' domestic sales drop far more signi…cantly than exporters' foreign sales, also inconsistent with the Japanese experience.
Sensitivity Analysis
This section considers government-spending shocks as an alternative to home-demand shocks.
For this purpose, we revise the market-clearing equation for …nal output to where G t denotes government spending. We re-calibrate the model by setting the steadystate government spending-to-GDP ratio G/Y to 14%, and assume the government spending shock follows an AR(1) process with persistence , log(G t+1 ) log (G) = (log(G t ) log (G)) + " G;t+1 :
The impulse response of …rm sales in the model to a 1% change in G t is shown in Figure 9 , which is very similar to the case under the domestic-preference shock; namely, non-exporters' sales drop more signi…cantly than exporters' foreign sales, which is inconsistent with the Japanese …rm data.
Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions. First, we document a new stylized fact about exporter behavior and trade collapse using Japanese …rm data. The stylized fact shows that exporters' domestic sales are more volatile than their foreign sales, which in turn are more volatile than non-exporters' total sales during a domestically triggered …nancial crisis.
Second, we propose a dynamic international trade model with …nancial intermediation and credit reallocation across …rms to explain the newly documented Japanese …rm behaviors.
The model is applied to examine the di¤erential e¤ects of …nancial and non-…nancial shocks on the economy. The results show that our model's implications are consistent with both the aggregate data and the …rm-level data during a …nancial crisis if the key driving force of the crisis stems from a …nancial shock. In particular, our model lends support to …nancial shocks as the chief explanation for a trade collapse during a …nancial crisis, while non-…nancial shocks such as changes in aggregate demand and TFP will likely be the endogenous outcome of the …nancial crisis rather than the root cause of the trade collapse.
The mechanism is as follows: (i) Exporters are more productive and thus opt to enter the foreign market by paying a higher …xed cost; (ii) …nancial intermediation is able to channel capital from low-productive …rms to high-productive …rms, which means that exporters are able to rely more heavily on outside credits to …nance their operations than non-exporters are and thus become more sensitive to …nancial conditions; (iii) consequently, a domestic …nancial crisis or credit crunch that hinders the healthy ‡ow of funds from less-productive to more-productive …rms will have a larger (asymmetric) e¤ect on exporters than on nonexporters, as well as a larger e¤ect on exporters' domestic sales than their foreign sales, resulting in a larger fall in trade volume than aggregate output and the correct ordering of changes in …rm sales, consistent with the Japanese experience.
These predictions of our model thus o¤er a reasonable explanation for the newly documented Japanese …rm behaviors after a domestic …nancial crisis, while still consistent with the great trade collapse observed after the 2008 global …nancial crisis.
Our model also shows that in the long run, countries with deeper …nancial markets are able to achieve higher measured TFP and output levels and a larger share of exports in GDP.
Therefore, …nancial development appears to be a great source of "comparative advantage," enabling more …rms to enter and stay in foreign markets, albeit making them more vulnerable to …nancial shocks.
Our model can be extended in many ways. For example, we can introduce persistent …rm-level productivity di¤erences across …rms to capture the fact that …rms change their export status infrequently. 14 We can also extend our model to a two-country framework, which is likely to enhance our results because a …nancial crisis in the home country reduces the demand for foreign goods, which can act as a demand shock to the foreign country's output (as emphasized by Eaton et al., 2011); a recession in the foreign country will then feed back to the home country, reinforcing the …nancial crisis. Thus, we expect that a twocountry version of our model is able to explain the cross-country business-cycle comovements 14 For example, based on highly disaggregated U.S. import data for 1972-2001, Besedes and Prusa (2006) found that trade duration is rather short lived, with a median of 2 to 4 years, and 67% of trade relationships hold only one year. Notice that in the original Melitz (2003) model, …rms never change their export status once entering the foreign market unless hit by a death shock. Hence, our model is already a signi…cant improvement over the Melitz model in accounting for the observed transition probability of exporters and non-exporters.
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puzzle. Extensions such as these are left as our future projects.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 2
The uncontrained …rms' capital demand is from equation (34). The constrained …rms' capital is under the maximum possible debt. Labor demand follows from equation (24) by plugging in the capital demand. Equations (23) and (26) give the cash- ‡ow expressions.
Proof of Proposition 3
Equation (62) is by de…nition. The bond market-clearing condition is
Plugging in the Pareto distribution for idiosyncratic productivity z, we obtain that
which is equation (63). Equations (64) 
